Incubator Feature in Java 17 (JEP 412 — First Incubator). Package: jdk.incubator.foreign. Requires --add-modules jdk.incubator.foreign at compile and runtime. This API evolved significantly across Java 18 (JEP 419), 19 (JEP 424), 20 (JEP 434), and was finalized in Java 22 (JEP 454). See the Java 21 article series for the final API. This article covers the Java 17 incubator version and the Project Panama vision. Why Replace JNI? Java Native Interface (JNI) has been the way to call native code from Java since Java 1.
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Foreign Function & Memory API (JEP 442): Calling Native Code Without JNI
Preview Feature in Java 21 — Finalized in Java 22 (JEP 454). The API shown here is the Java 21 preview version; it is nearly identical to the final API. Why Replace JNI? Java Native Interface (JNI) has been the standard way to call native code since Java 1.1. It works but is notoriously painful: Requires writing C wrapper code for every native call Native method signatures must exactly match Java declarations (or you get silent crashes) Memory management is manual — leak native memory once and you have a slow memory leak JNI calls disable JIT optimizations around the call site Debugging native crashes through JNI is extremely difficult The Foreign Function & Memory (FFM) API replaces all of this: call native functions directly from Java, manage native memory safely with automatic lifetime management, and do it without writing a single line of C.
Continue reading »Form Login Authentication: From Request to Session
Form Login: The Classic Web Authentication Flow Form login is the traditional authentication mechanism for server-rendered web applications. The user fills in a username and password form, the server verifies credentials, creates a session, and returns a session cookie. All subsequent requests carry that cookie. sequenceDiagram participant Browser participant SSF as Spring Security Filters participant AM as AuthenticationManager participant SS as HTTP Session Store participant Controller Browser->>SSF: GET /dashboard (unauthenticated) SSF->>SS: Save original request (RequestCache) SSF-->>Browser: 302 Redirect to /login Browser->>SSF: GET /login SSF-->>Browser: 200 HTML login page Browser->>SSF: POST /login {username, password} SSF->>AM: authenticate(UsernamePasswordToken) AM-->>SSF: Authentication (success) SSF->>SS: Store SecurityContext in session SSF-->>Browser: 302 Redirect to /dashboard\nSet-Cookie: JSESSIONID=abc123 Browser->>SSF: GET /dashboard (JSESSIONID cookie) SSF->>SS: Load SecurityContext from session SSF->>Controller: Request with authenticated user Controller-->>Browser: 200 Dashboard HTML Minimal Configuration @Configuration @EnableWebSecurity public class SecurityConfig { @Bean public SecurityFilterChain securityFilterChain(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception { http .
Continue reading »Generational ZGC (JEP 439): Sub-Millisecond Pauses at Any Scale
Why GC Still Matters in 2024 Even with better APIs and faster hardware, garbage collection pauses remain one of the top causes of latency spikes in Java services. A 200ms GC pause in a payment processing service is a customer-visible failure. A 50ms pause in a trading system is a missed execution window. Java 21 delivers Generational ZGC — the most capable GC Java has ever shipped — as a production-ready, non-preview feature.
Continue reading »Handling Deserialization Errors Gracefully
The Problem: Poison Pills at Deserialization Time A malformed byte sequence — truncated JSON, wrong Avro schema, corrupt payload — throws an exception during deserialization, before the listener method is called. Without special handling, this record blocks the partition indefinitely: the consumer fetches it, fails to deserialize, and fetches it again on the next poll. sequenceDiagram participant Broker participant Container participant Deserializer loop forever without ErrorHandlingDeserializer Container->>Broker: poll() Broker-->>Container: [good-record, CORRUPT-RECORD, good-record] Container->>Deserializer: deserialize(CORRUPT-RECORD) Deserializer-->>Container: JsonProcessingException 💥 Note over Container: Partition blocked — same record on every poll end ErrorHandlingDeserializer solves this by catching the deserialization exception and wrapping it in a DeserializationException that the listener container can route to the error handler.
Continue reading »How Spring Security Works: The Big Picture
Why Spring Security Is Hard to Learn Spring Security is not complex because the concepts are complex. Authentication and authorization are straightforward ideas. Spring Security is hard because it hides its machinery: a request comes in, something happens, an endpoint is secured or not — and without knowing the internal architecture, the behaviour feels magical and the configuration feels arbitrary. This article removes the magic. By the end, you will have the mental model needed to understand every other concept in this series.
Continue reading »HTTP Authorization: Securing Endpoints with requestMatchers
HTTP Authorization: The Last Line of Defense AuthorizationFilter is the last filter in the Spring Security chain. After all authentication filters have run (and either set an Authentication or left it as anonymous), AuthorizationFilter makes the final access decision: allow or deny. The rules you write in authorizeHttpRequests() are evaluated in order, first match wins. flowchart TD Request[HTTP Request] --> Auth[AuthorizationFilter] Auth --> Rules{Evaluate rules\nin order} Rules -->|Rule 1 matches| Decision1{Allowed?
Continue reading »HTTP Basic Authentication and Stateless APIs
What Is HTTP Basic Authentication? HTTP Basic is the simplest authentication scheme defined in the HTTP specification (RFC 7617). The client encodes username:password in Base64 and sends it in the Authorization header with every request: Authorization: Basic YWxpY2U6c2VjcmV0 ↑ Base64("alice:secret") Important: Base64 is encoding, not encryption. Anyone who intercepts the request can decode the credentials instantly. HTTP Basic must only be used over HTTPS. sequenceDiagram participant Client as API Client participant SSF as Spring Security Filters participant AM as AuthenticationManager Client->>SSF: GET /api/data\n(no Authorization header) SSF-->>Client: 401 Unauthorized\nWWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="
Continue reading »Idempotent Producers: Eliminating Duplicate Messages
The Duplicate Problem With acks=all and retries enabled, a produce request might be acknowledged by the broker, but the acknowledgment is lost in the network before reaching the producer. The producer, seeing no response, retries — sending the same record again. The broker writes it a second time. The consumer sees a duplicate. sequenceDiagram participant Producer participant Leader as Broker (Leader) Producer->>Leader: ProduceRequest: OrderPlaced (orderId=1001) Leader->>Leader: Write record at offset 42 ✓ Leader--xProducer: ProduceResponse LOST (network failure) Note over Producer: No ack received — retrying Producer->>Leader: ProduceRequest: OrderPlaced (orderId=1001) [RETRY] Leader->>Leader: Write record at offset 43 ✓ (DUPLICATE!
Continue reading »Inheritance Strategies: SINGLE_TABLE, JOINED, TABLE_PER_CLASS
Introduction Object-oriented code uses inheritance to share behaviour. Relational databases have no concept of inheritance. JPA bridges this gap with three strategies for mapping a class hierarchy to tables. Understanding when each is appropriate prevents schema headaches and performance problems. The Domain Example An e-commerce system has different types of discount: Discount (abstract) ├── PercentageDiscount (e.g., 10% off) └── FixedAmountDiscount (e.g., $5 off) All discounts share: id, name, validFrom, validUntil. PercentageDiscount adds: percentage (e.
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